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UNLAWFUL PRACTICE OF LAW
The following is the opinion of the court in Case No.
13,583, in the matter of the complaint against certain of the
Denver clearing house banks.
The opinion is followed by a statement of the principles
and canons of ethics between the Denver Bar Association and
the trust departments of the banks.
Complainants are hereinafter referred to as the Commit-
tee, and respondents as the Banks, or as The Colorado, The
International, The Denver, The United States, and The
American, respectively. The Committee says the Banks are
practicing law and the Banks deny the charge.
Originally one Walker charged The Colorado and its
trust officers that through said officer, but as the corporation,
it drafted a will, probated it and administered trust estates
thereby created. This complaint was referred to the Com-
mittee with directions to "give the matters therein set forth
thorough and careful consideration and record fully its find-
ings in the premises." "Matters," said the Court, "is in-
tended to cover the entire subject irrespective of how limited
the issues in the particular case might be."
The Colorado denied receiving compensation for draft-
ing the questioned will, otherwise it admitted. The Commit-
tee sent questionnaires to the Banks and these were answered.
A hearing before the Committee followed at which the Banks
were represented by counsel. The matter was submitted on
printed briefs, which, on request of counsel and by our order,
later became the briefs now before us. The Committee pre-
sented its majority report and one of its members, which
might be termed a specially concurring report. We ordered
these filed and authorized the Committee to prosecute the
charges before this court in its own name with Mr. Melville
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as its counsel. Oral argument followed and the cause was
finally submitted.
It will be observed that we thus have before us an agreed
case in which the banks, save The Colorado, voluntarily ap-
peared.
At the time this matter was referred to the Committee
it was contemplated that it might be necessary or advisable,
if it proceeded to final hearing before us, either to hand down
an opinion that would cover a very broad field, or adopt a
rule which would serve the same purpose. Various consid-
erations have, however, obviated that necessity. Among these
may be noted that it is alleged herein and not denied that the
Banks have administered no estates since September 1, 1929,
without the services of an attorney outside of their organiza-
tions. It also appears, as a matter of common knowledge in
banking and legal circles, hence noticeable judicially in a pro-
ceeding such as this, that the Banks and the Denver Bar As-
sociation have entered into an amicable agreement as to the
respective fields of lawyers and trust companies. While such
an agreement is in no respect binding upon the courts, nor
conclusive as to what is or is not "practicing law," it raises
the strongest presumption that in general no present cause of
complaint against the Banks with respect to minor and col-
lateral matters now exist. Two points, however, are pre-
sented, the adjudication of which seems indispensable to a final
disposition of this proceeding. The Committee reports, and
we think the evidence before us supports the conclusion, that
the Banks as a practice, (1) have drafted wills wherein they
were named as executors or trustees, and given legal advice to
the testators with respect thereto; (2) have drawn living
trust indentures and life insurance trust agreements in which
they were named as trustees, and given legal advice to the
executorsof such documnts; in both classes of cases without
testator or executor having independent legal advice.
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Before disposing of the questions thus presented we make
one brief observation on the fact and restate one admitted and
governing proposition of law.
The questioned acts of the banks have been performed
by their trust officers. These officers are regular salaried em-
ployees, integral and essential parts of the bank's organiza-
tion, generally members of the bar but practically limited, by
custom or contract, to the bank's business, hence in all their
acts on behalf of the corporation as much a part of it as its
president or cashier.
Corporations cannot practice law. "Practice of the Law"
is not limited to practice before the Court. 2 R. C. L., Sec.
4, page 938. But under all attempted definitions it includes
the drafting of documents which of necessity must be pre-
sented to, and their legality passed upon by, the courts.
1. We think the drawing of wills, as a practice, is the
practice of law, and this for three reasons: First, because of
the profound legal knowledge necessary for one who makes
a practice of this work; second, because all these instruments,
before they become effective, must be filed in and administered
by a Court; and, third, because what we consider the weight
of authority so holds. People vs. People's Stockyards State
Bank, 344 Illinois 462, 176 N. E. 902; Will of Marek, 177
Wis. 194, 198, 187 N. W. 1009; People vs. People's Trust
Company, 167 N. Y. Supp. 767, 180 App. Div. 494; In re
Eastern Idaho Loan & Trust Co., 49 Idaho 280, 288 Pac.
157.
2. In our opinion the practice of drafting living trust
indentures and life insurance trust agreements and giving
legal advice to the executors of such documents, is likewise
"the practice of law;" but for reasons hereinafter appearing
it is unnecessary to elaborate this ruling.
Since the record before us discloses no desire to mulct the
Banks in damages and discloses no wish to do more than set-
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tie the law and establish the correct practice, and finding the
Banks have in some instances technically and doubtless unin-
tentionally overstepped the bounds here established, we ad-
judge them to pay the costs of this proceeding.
That the foregoing questions, and others collaterally
involved herein may be the more effectively placed before the
profession in this jurisdiction and similar controversies
avoided in the future we have this day adopted the following
rule, effective September 1, 1936:
'Practicing law,' forbidden to persons not thereto duly
licensed, is not limited to practice before the courts. Corpora-
tions shall not practice law. The practice of drafting wills,
living trust indentures and life insurance trust agreements is
the practice of law and counsel for executors and trustees
named therein may not act as counsel for their testators -or
creators."
It should be added that those portions of the foregoing
rule dealing with practices complained of in this proceeding
are covered by the agreement heretofore referred to between
the banks and the Denver Bar Association. So that the rule
fixes no limits on the activities of the banks save such as they
have already fixed by their contract. It is of course immate-
rial that the contract stipulates that its execution is no admis-
sion on the part of the banks that the acts from which it
therein agrees to refrain constitute the practice of law.
Mr. Justice Bouck, desiring time to examine the record
more thoroughly, is not ready to vote, and he may file a
separate opinion when he has reached a conclusion.
Mr. Chief Justice Campbell not participating.
Jesse H. Jones, Chairman of the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion, reports that Wyoming is the only state in the Union in which it
has been unnecessary to disburse any of the money authorized by the
RFC Act for distribution to depositors in closed banks.
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